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We currently live in increasingly diversified and fluctuating societies. Organisation changes, 
climate changes, and immigration are prime examples. With respect to immigration specifically, 
approximately 175 million people living outside their country of birth in 2002 (United Nations, 
2002). Individuals are also more likely than they were to change jobs and careers, with an estimated 
average of 11 changes in jobs in one career (Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, 
2010). Changes in social networks and in family structure are also noticeable, with approximately 
40% of individuals likely to divorce in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2006). Moreover, scholars have 
observed changes in patterns of social connectivity among US citizens; for instance, the percentage 
of survey respondents who reported having a friend, rather than a family member, as a close 
confidant has decreased from 73% to 51% over two decades (McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Brashears, 
2006).  Such changes in social networks and family structure typically have implications for self and 
identity, given the associated accentuation or attenuation of particular elements of the self-concept. 
At a more macroscopic level, many countries – such as Egypt and Libya – are also currently 
experiencing important changes in their political structure (BBC, 2011; Reuters, 2011), and recent 
campaigns worldwide (e.g., Occupy Wall Street Movement) suggest a deep questioning of – and 
even an upsurge against – the current economic system (see also de la Sablonnière & Usborne, this 
volume). In the present chapter, we raise the following questions: How do individuals make sense of 
these changes and come to develop a sense of identification with new social groups (e.g., 
organizational groups, political groups, friendship groups, family)? As these new identifications 
develop over time, what needs and principles will these new groups fulfill for individual group 
members? How do individuals negotiate their different and potentially conflicting group 
memberships?  
We argue in this chapter that such life transitions and social changes – originally external to 
people – have repercussions for how people perceive their own sense of self. Although humans are 
active agents with a sense of free will who can actively block some of these external influences 
(Baumeister, 2008) and choose what dimensions to display and play up or down, these actions and 
choices are also constrained by powerful situational forces (Zimbardo, 2007). Individuals realise 
fully the extent of these external constraints when they experience situations over which they have 
little or not control, such as being a victim of discrimination or when feeling that some of the 
dimensions of themselves are socially devalued (Crocker & Major, 1989), and that their integrity is 
compromised.  
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The goal of the current chapter is threefold, namely: (i) to explain how individuals, in times 
of change, come to integrate new identities intra-individually in their sense of self and maintain a 
feeling of psychological coherence in this process; (ii) to highlight how the identity principles 
proposed by identity process theory (IPT) come into play throughout this change process and how 
the satisfaction of these principles may actually facilitate the integration of new and multiple social 
identities in the self; and (iii) to identify some factors that may actively block the integration of these 
identities, namely feelings of identity threat and the social devaluation of certain identities relative to 
others. We base ourselves on different strands of research to make these points, and more 
specifically, the cognitive-developmental model of social identity integration (CDMSII; Amiot, de la 
Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007), IPT (Breakwell, 1986), and the concept of psychological 
coherence (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). Throughout the chapter, an implicit goal is to build bridges 
between these different social psychological theories as they are each relevant to addressing these 
issues, and also provide a broad and integrative framework to understand how diversity can be 
reconciled subjectively and intra-individually – within each individual.  
Defining the Notions of Identity Integration and Psychological Coherence 
Let us start first by defining what we mean by the terms identity integration and 
psychological coherence.  
Identity integration. According to the CDMSII, when multiple identities become integrated 
in the self, they are organized within the global self-structure such that they can be simultaneously 
important to the overall self-concept. When this occurs, connections and links are established 
between these different self-components so that they do not feel fragmented (e.g., Donahue, Robins, 
Roberts, & John, 1993). As a consequence, the self feels coherent rather than conflicted (Amiot, de 
la Sablonnière, et al., 2007). Hence, identity integration should have positive consequences for 
psychological well-being. Because the integration of one’s identities enables the individual to draw 
similarities between the different self-defining characteristics, identity integration allows for a more 
coherent vision of the self, where differences between one’s different identities are considered 
complimentary rather than conflicting (e.g., Amiot, de la Sablonnière, et al., 2007; Benet-Martinez, 
Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, & Cree, 2004; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).  
This view of identity integration emphasises the cognitive nature of the self and in this sense, 
it is directly based on principles from the social cognition literature. In the social cognition literature, 
researchers view the self as a multifaceted cognitive structure (Markus, 1977; Markus & Wurf, 
1987), that can be defined as ‘‘a collection of at least semi-related and highly domain-specific 
knowledge structures’’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 182). While social identities deal specifically with 
group memberships as they derive from our memberships to social groups (Tajfel, 1981), they can 
also be conceived as one specific type of self-component composing the global self (Deaux, 1991). 
Because the same individual can belong to a wide variety of groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), 
the self-concept is hence composed of multiple social identities. But how is this multiplicity 
represented and organised cognitively? 
Self-schemas are a useful concept to illustrate how the self is organized cognitively, and how 
one’s multiple social identities, as specific self-components, are organized within the self. Self-
schemas are hierarchical knowledge structures that organize and guide the processing of self-
relevant information specifically (Markus, 1977). In terms of structure, self-schemas are organized 
hierarchically such that the more specific elements are subsumed under more inclusive ones 
(Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1994; Marsh & Shavelson, 1985). We argue that both self-schemas and social 
identities – because they are particular cognitive elements – are also capable of both short-term 
situational activation and long-term structural changes (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, et al., 2007; 
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Markus & Kunda, 1986; Smith, 1996). Concretely, this means that the social context may activate 
the reliance on one particular group membership – the one that the most cognitively salient and 
functional in a particular context (in line with self-categorisation principles: Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and also that as these situational activations accumulate over time, 
some structural changes will take place in the self-concept such that a new social identity may 
become a recurrent part of the self (Markus & Wurf, 1987). To understand how individuals change 
when undergoing important life transitions and social changes, we focus on the process of intra-
individual changes in social identities – that is, how the configuration and the structure of 
individuals’ multiple social identities undergoes significant change over time (e.g., Cervone, 2005). 
Accounting for this intra-individual process is a main contribution of the CDMSII  (Amiot, de la 
Sablonnière, et al., 2007).  
Psychological coherence. Like identity integration, the notion of psychological coherence 
captures how individuals feel subjectively about the different elements that define who they are as a 
person. At its most basis level, psychological coherence refers to the individual’s need to perceive 
compatibility and coherence between interconnected self-aspects or elements of the identity 
structure (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). Human beings have multiple identities; multiple identification 
is the norm, rather than the exception. Hence, the individual is typically presented with a vast 
amount of information, some of which may be contradictory and incompatible, and which becomes 
subject to the psychological process of assimilation-accommodation and evaluation (Breakwell, 
2001). Two or more identity elements may be thought of as ‘‘interconnected’’ if dominant (i.e., 
mainstream) social representations construct them as having implications for one another.  
Drawing upon IPT, proponents of psychological coherence have hypothesised that 
individuals are psychologically motivated to enhance feelings of compatibility and coherence 
between these elements of themselves, especially in contexts of multiple identification with 
interconnected identity elements (i.e., either group-level elements such as social identities or 
individual-level traits; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Jaspal & Coyle, 2009; Jaspal & Siraj, 2011). If the 
need for psychological coherence is not fulfilled, identity becomes susceptible to threat, inducing the 
individual to engage in strategies to counteract the threat. In this sense, psychological coherence can 
be seen as an additional identity principle in the IPT framework.  
Importantly, the perceived coherence among one’s identities is both fluid and context-
dependent, and it is very much subjective: it resides ‘‘in the eye of the perceiver and [is] not some 
objective quality of the identities under scrutiny’’ (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010, p. 866). In a recent 
study on the management of national and religious identities among British South Asians (Jaspal, 
2011), British Pakistanis subjectively perceived far greater connectedness and less coherence 
between their national and religious identities than British Indians. 
Social psychologists have also employed the concept of psychological coherence in order to 
understand how individuals subjectively personalise and manage multiple (and potentially 
incompatible) social representations. Social representations can be defined in terms of systems of 
meaning, which can provide explanations and orientations for the surrounding social world 
(Moscovici, 1988). Social representations are often associated with particular social group 
memberships. A given social group has its own ‘‘system of meaning’’ and provide its members with 
access to these systems. The construct of psychological coherence readily acknowledges the 
influence of prevailing social representations concerning identities, their qualitative nature and their 
compatibility. For instance, British Muslim gay men may fear ‘‘coming out’’, that is, publicly 
disclosing membership in the categories ‘‘Muslim’’ and ‘‘gay’’, due to their awareness of negative 
social representations of homosexuality within religious circles (Jaspal & Siraj, 2011).  
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 Although psychological coherence has been considered an identity principle (Jaspal & 
Cinnirella, 2010), some IPT researchers have questioned the distinction between the psychological 
coherence and continuity principles of identity (e.g. Vignoles, 2011; Breakwell, this volume). While 
the continuity principle is concerned with maintaining a temporal connection between past, present 
and future and is, thus, diachronic (Breakwell, 1986), the psychological coherence principle is 
largely synchronic as it requires feelings of identity compatibility and coherence at a particular point 
in time (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2012). Thus, it seems that psychological coherence may be particularly 
relevant to the present discussion of identity compatibility and identity integration, although – and as 
we elaborate below – it is fully acknowledged that other identity principles are likely, over time, to 
become active during the process of identity integration. 
Supporting the utility of accounting specifically for the principle of psychological coherence 
and for its synchronic nature, Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) found that British Muslim gay men 
perceived their religious and sexual identities as ‘‘pre-existing identities’’, which were 
simultaneously primordial in the self-concept at a point in time. Consequently, the threat to identity 
entailed by the combination of these identities was due to synchronic incompatibility. In another 
study, Jaspal and Cinnirella (2012) discuss threats to identity which result from British Muslim gay 
men’s incipient experiences in gay affirmative social contexts. From a diachronic perspective, 
starting to be involved in gay space is likely to threaten identity continuity. Yet, even if the 
individual is successful in overcoming this threat to continuity, the synchronic threat may remain, 
since the individual is still required to reconcile the two conflicting identities at a particular point in 
time. In short, we need to account for both the principles of continuity and of psychological 
coherence, two phenomenologically distinct principles, in order to fully capture the rich and 
complex identity implications of threats to both of these principles.  
Contrasting the notions of identity integration and psychological coherence. The identity 
integration and psychological coherence concepts share a number of similarities but also some 
conceptual differences. In terms of similarities, these concepts both focus on the subjective 
representation of one’s multiple self-elements – such as the identities and characteristics that apply 
to oneself. Both the notions of identity integration and psychological coherence also focus on the 
notion of cognitive links and the importance of finding ways to ‘‘tie’’ and to cognitively bind one’s 
different identities and self-components (Amiot, de la Sablonnière et al., 2007). In this sense, both 
concepts share the assumption that individuals are motivated to reach a state of psychological 
comfort that is devoid of tensions and intra-individual conflict (see also Festinger, 1957). Finally, 
both concepts share – at least implicitly – the idea that the social context (e.g., social representations) 
may influence the individuals’ identity configuration, or at the very least, prompt them to position 
themselves with regards to this environment and decide – if choice is indeed an option – which 
identity to play up or play down.  
In terms of the differences between these concepts, social identity integration focuses on the 
integration of social identities specifically, whereas psychological coherence applies to a broader 
range of self-components, including personal and social identities as well as individual traits. 
Identity integration is mainly cognitive, based on social cognition principles, and assumes a 
hierarchical structure to the self-concept. In contrast, psychological coherence is a subjective notion 
that applies to different components of the self, and which puts less emphasis on the cognitive 
organisation and the structure of these elements per se. Finally, while the psychological coherence 
principle emphasises the recurrent and chronic role of identity threat in the process of binding and 
linking one’s different self-elements (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010, 2012), the cognitive-developmental 
model of social identity integration – as we will be discussing below – recognises the role that threat 
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plays in the identity integration process (e.g., Amiot, Terry, & McKimmie, 2012; Amiot, Terry, & 
Callan, 2007) while also accounting for other antecedents that can facilitate social identity 
integration – such as coping and social support (e.g., Amiot, Terry, Callan, & Jimmieson, 2006; 
Amiot, Terry, Wirawan, & Grice, 2010). In the current chapter, our goal is to bring together the 
identity integration, psychological coherence, and identity principles concepts together. Within this 
theoretical integration, we seek to discuss: (i) when the different identity principles of self-esteem, 
continuity, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, meaning, belonging and coherence will become activated as 
a new social identity is acquired over time; and (ii) how social representations and subjective 
perceptions associated with relevant social groups (e.g., identity threat) may impinge upon identity 
integration.   
Stages and Mechanisms through which Identities Become Integrated over Time 
How do one’s multiple identities become integrated in people’s sense of self exactly, such 
that the self feels coherent rather than in conflict? In the CDMSII, we propose four stages of change 
by which one’s different social identities become integrated over time (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, et 
al., 2007). At each stage, we also outline how the six basic principles of distinctiveness, continuity, 
self-esteem, self-efficacy, meaning, belonging and coherence may come into play and become 
particularly salient (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2002). We propose that, if satisfied, these 
principles will facilitate the integration of one’s different identities and will allow the person to 
move forward in the identity integration process. By doing so, we also wish to highlight how each 
principle may become particularly relevant to satisfy at a point in time, and to bring a temporal and 
dynamic perspective to the process of need satisfaction in group settings.  
The role of needs and principles. In prior research, we found that the satisfaction of the needs 
for autonomy, competence, and relatedness – needs that are fundamental according to self-
determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) – predicted more active forms of coping and increased 
identification with new social groups over time (Amiot et al., 2010). Herein, we argue that other 
types of principles – those proposed by Breakwell (1986), Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) and by 
Vignoles et al. (2002) – may also fuel the development of new social identities. More broadly, we 
propose that the extent to which one’s needs and principles are satisfied in a particular group context 
will not only facilitate the recognition, acceptance, and endorsement of one’s new identity, but it will 
provide the psychological impetus, the social resources, and the energy that are necessary to make 
the necessary adjustment to one’s sense of self and to derive well-being in this process.  
Stages of change. Based on developmental principles (e.g., Harter, 1999), the first stage 
proposed by the CDMSII and involved in the identity integration process takes place as individuals 
are planning to join a new social group in the future. During this anticipatory categorisation stage, 
we propose that a process of self-anchoring operates, where the individual about to join a new social 
group will project his or her own personal characteristics onto this novel social ingroup (e.g., Otten 
& Wentura, 2001). For example, a British Muslim gay man planning on frequenting ‘‘gay space’’ 
such as gay nightclubs could anticipate that some of his personal characteristics also apply to other 
non-Muslim British gay men who habitually frequent this social space (Jaspal & Siraj, 2011). Seeing 
gayness as a trait of his own personal identity, the British Muslim gay men may anticipate this 
commonality in self-definition between himself and other people in ‘‘gay space’’. This projection 
and self-anchoring process allows one to find similarities between one’s personal identity and the 
new social identity to be integrated. As another example, we could think of an Australian immigrant 
preparing to arrive in Canada. At the anticipatory categorisation stage – just before arriving in her 
new country – she may anticipate that some of her own characteristics will also apply to Canadians 
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in general. Being herself an extraverted and sociable person, she could foresee that Canadians will 
also be extraverted.  
It is likely that the self-anchoring process – which is central to anticipatory categorisation – 
will enhance the continuity principle of identity (Sani, 2008), given that the psychological projection 
of existing traits and characteristics onto the novel identity can form a psychological bridge between 
past, present and future. The establishment of cognitive links between a pre-existing social identity 
and a novel social group in which the individual aspires to acquire membership establishes a 
temporal bridge. Moreover, it is easy to see how the belonging principle may acquire psychological 
salience at this stage, since the individual is able to foresee acceptance and inclusion in the social 
group, in which they anticipate membership. These feelings of belonging are facilitated by the 
process of self-anchoring, given that the individual perceives a ‘‘fit’’ between existing traits and 
those regarded as being prevalent in the novel social group, which will provide entry in the social 
group. Clearly, this requires engagement with social representations of the ‘‘necessary’’ self-aspects 
for membership, acceptance and inclusion in the group (Simon, 2004).  
The second stage of social identity integration refers to categorisation. At this point, group 
members are in the process of actually joining their new social group. The contact with this new 
group also leads the newcomer to realise how different and potentially divergent their new and 
original group memberships may be. Intergroup dynamics are likely to emerge at this stage. Distinct 
identities are recognised and differences (in terms of values and norms) among social identities 
become highly salient. This phenomenon is analogous to the culture clash in the acculturation 
literature, where immigrants feel conflicted between the cultures as they confront incongruous sets 
of cultural demands (e.g., Leong & Ward, 2000). Because at this stage, the differences between the 
identities are particularly salient, the individual undergoing the change cannot yet perceive any 
similarities or form cognitive links between these groups, nor does he or she yet consider the 
possibility of being part of these different groups. Going back to the Australian immigrant to 
Canada, she may realise upon arrival that her pre-conceived ideas about how Canadians would be 
similar to her are not as accurate as she would have hoped – with certain Canadians being much less 
extraverted and sociable then what she had expected, and some being even annoyed at not being able 
to understand her accent, creating an additional and unforeseen linguistic barrier. 
In terms of identity processes (Breakwell, 1986), the actual experience of change has the 
potential to threaten the continuity principle, because the individual makes their transition from 
anticipatory categorisation (which focuses on similarities) to actual categorisation (which conversely 
highlights differences). The unifying psychological thread between past, present and future – which 
is initially constructed by anticipatory categorisation – is potentially jeopardised by the actual 
experience of change. Conversely, the salience of the differences between the existing group 
membership and the novel social group renders the distinctiveness principle highly relevant and 
provides scope for the enhancement of this principle. The outcomes for the self-esteem principle at 
that stage are more complex; social representations and social comparison processes dictate the 
social ‘‘status’’ of one’s existing group membership and hence determine whether this 
distinctiveness between the identities will be positive or negative (Vignoles et al., 2000). Moreover, 
the perceived differences between one’s existing and anticipated group memberships can jeopardise 
feelings of belonging in the novel group. More specifically, not feeling that Canadians are sociable 
and that some are even closed-minded with respect to foreigners who have a different accent may 
compromise the Australian immigrant’s sense of belonging.  
At the compartmentalisation stage, the new identity stops to be considered as external and 
foreign to the person’s self-concept and instead, increasingly becomes part of the self. As new group 
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members gather experiences in their new social group over time, they will come to develop a sense 
of identification with his or her new social group. At this point, the individual will also realise that 
this identity is becoming increasingly part of him or herself. However, cognitively, the different 
identities are kept in distinct ‘‘compartments’’ within the self at this stage. Concretely, this means 
that the similarities and the linkages between these identities are not yet completely established; the 
identities are still perceived as being quite distinct elements. At the compartmentalisation stage, the 
identities are also context-dependent, meaning that they become salient depending on the social 
context and the situational cues. This context-dependent nature of the social identification process at 
this stage is analogous to Roccas and Brewer’s (2002) compartmentalized representation of multiple 
social identities – in which one particular social identity becomes primary in a particular social 
context relative to the other identities, and also with self-categorisation theory’s idea that one 
particular social identity can become activated if it is the most relevant one to endorse in a specific 
context (i.e., meta-contrast ratio; Turner et al., 1987). For example, the Australian-Canadian may 
feel Australian when meeting up with other Australians in Canada for BBQs yet feel Canadian when 
practicing typically Canadian winter sports. Her identities are therefore highly contextualised and 
distinct and are likely to be associated with different thoughts, attitudes, and behaviours. 
IPT theorists regard compartmentalisation as a strategy for protecting identity from threat, 
that is, for maintaining appropriate levels of the identity principles (Breakwell, 1986). Indeed, 
potential inconsistencies between particular social group memberships do not enter the 
psychological forefront, which essentially protects the psychological coherence principle from 
threat. Furthermore, the salience of social group membership in ‘‘appropriate’’ social contexts (e.g., 
feeling more Muslim in the mosque and more gay in gay nightclubs in the case of British Muslim 
gay men) can safeguard the belonging principle of identity. The individual is able to derive feelings 
of acceptance and inclusion from relevant others in social contexts, given that the ‘‘problematic’’ 
identity is not allowed, at a psychological level, to inhibit a sense of belonging. The 
compartmentalisation of one’s social identities clearly elucidates the agency that human beings have 
in constructing and managing identity. This agency can provide the individual with feelings of 
control and competence over their life and future. Thus, it can be hypothesised that the self-efficacy 
principle of identity acquires salience during the compartmentalisation stage.  
The fourth stage is integration. At this last stage, the individual will fully realise that 
conflicts between identities exist and that, if these conflicts are to be resolved, resources must be put 
forward (e.g., Phinney, 2003). This would take place as the individual realises that the behaviours he 
or she displays are somewhat different to those displayed in another social context. Such 
contradictions and conflicts could be reconciled by finding similarities and by drawing broader links 
between one’s different social identities. For example, the Australian-Canadian could bridge her 
Canadian and Australian identities by focusing on the founding values that are shared by people of 
both countries, such as democracy, freedom of speech, and liberalism. Engaging in these conflict-
resolution strategies will not only allow these two individuals to establish cognitive linkage between 
their different identities, but it will also maximise the feeling that, even though their behaviours 
change and adjust across social contexts, they can still experience an overall sense of personal 
coherence and consistency across these situations, and they are still the same person (Amiot & de la 
Sablonnière, 2010). This integration phase should hence result in the recognition that one’s different 
social identities are no longer (completely) context-dependent, and that each identity contributes to 
the overall self-concept in a unique manner (e.g., Harter, 1999; Harter & Monsour, 1992). 
As a specific identity principle (Jaspal, 2011), psychological coherence could induce 
individuals to move towards this integration stage. Although this final stage of identity integration 
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should have positive outcomes for this principle, the impact for the other motivational principles of 
identity seems to be less straightforward and can vary in accordance with situational context. Like 
compartmentalisation, the integration stage may render salient the self-efficacy principle of identity 
because the ability to deploy socio-psychological resources for the minimisation of identity conflict 
and for the reconciliation of social group members can provide the individual with feelings of 
control and competence. Moreover, the individual can derive a greater sense of meaning from 
belonging in both groups and from their occupancy of their particular identity configuration. This 
may come to provide a sense of purpose which is beneficial for the meaning principle (Baumeister, 
1991). 
Furthermore, the perception of belonging to distinct social groups and of possessing self-
aspects associated with either group may benefit the distinctiveness principle, given that possessing 
this unique identity configuration can itself highlight one’s uniqueness, specificities, and strengths. 
However, as in the case of categorisation, the perception of distinctiveness which can result from the 
integration of distinct social identities may be positive or negative. Being a member of the group 
‘‘Canadian’’ may be regarded favourably at a social level, while the individual’s Muslim identity 
may be stigmatised by society - a point we elaborate upon later. Although the individual may 
establish linkage between these identities at a psychological level, the social stigma of their devalued 
identity may cause threats to self-esteem at the integration stage (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, et al., 
2007; Berry, 2006). Given that this process is dependent upon the immediate surrounding social 
context and upon which specific combination of identities are being integrated, the outcomes of this 
process for the self-esteem principle are highly context-dependent. In terms of the self-esteem 
principle, there is also a cost associated with identity integration. Because links are forged between 
these identities at the integration stage, each of the person’s identities become part of the self-
concept and are recognised as components of the person’s self, which may in fact perpetuate any 
threats to the self-esteem principle caused by membership in any one social group.  
The belonging principle can also become salient at the integration stage, because the 
individual recognises that he or she belongs to the different groups and hence may feel comfortable 
interacting with individuals from these social groups that are integrated within the self-concept. 
Although the individual reconciles these social group memberships at the psychological level, they 
have little control over how members of either social group will concretely interact with them as a 
result of their attachment to different social groups. For instance, although some British Muslim men 
who come out as gay do manage to reconcile their gay and Muslim identities, many still report 
ostracisation and a lack of belonging in both Muslim and gay circles (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2012; 
Jaspal & Siraj, 2011). This can be attributed to the stigma attached by other group members to the 
particular gay-Muslim identity configuration. 
Bringing together identity integration from the view of the CDMSII and IPT allows us to 
specify how the motivational principles of identity operate and have a potent effect at each stage of 
social identity integration, providing a more detailed insight into the psychological dynamics 
underlying the process of identity change. More specifically, this theoretical integration shows how 
the principles may be benefited or undermined during these stages, potentially inducing some 
individuals to dwell on one particular stage due to its psychological benefits and others to entirely 
sidestep other stages due to their potential psychological disadvantages. For instance, Coyle and 
Rafalin (2000) have indicated that gay Jews may remain at the compartmentalisation stage, without 
proceeding to the integration stage, due to the more favourable outcomes for identity they derive at 
that stage. Testing the hypotheses presented above may elucidate how individuals in particular social 
contexts may engage with the stages of identity integration. Moreover, by integrating IPT and the 
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CDMSII, we can directly test the important role of social representations in determining how 
individuals might respond socio-psychologically to the various stages leading to identity integration 
(Breakwell, this volume). For instance, in order to predict levels of belonging within the social 
groups which one seeks to reconcile in the self-concept, it is necessary to explore the social 
representations prevalent in either group. 
Inhibitors of the Identity Integration Process: Stigma and Devalued Identities 
We can now wonder what happens when the different groups the person belongs to differ 
widely in terms of how socially valued or devalued they are. In fact, more often than not, social 
groups differ in terms of the status or prestige they hold in a society (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). For 
instance, not all groups of immigrants are evaluated with the same valence within a society (e.g. 
Canada); with some groups (e.g. Australians) being more positively evaluated than others (e.g. 
Haitians). Going back to our example, if the Australian Canadian feels that both of her identities are 
socially valued, she may attribute high importance to both of these identities and report higher 
identity integration and psychological coherence. If she came from a country that possesses less 
social prestige, however, her identities may have clashed much more, and one of her identities – 
possibly the one that has the highest social status – may have eclipsed the lower status identity in her 
overall sense of self. 
In line with these examples, and building on an important body of work in acculturation 
psychology (Berry, 1997, 2006), we suggest that these differential perceptions of the social status of 
various groups – although they are originally external to the individual – may become internalised in 
the person’s sense of self. In fact, intergroup contexts that are highly stratified – such that the groups 
differ widely in terms of the status and power they hold in society – should encourage the dominance 
of one social identity (possibly the one with the highest status or power) over others, thus impeding 
the identity development process (Phinney, 1993, 2003). Concretely, this means that the person him 
or herself may come to reproduce this social consensus about what constitutes ‘‘valued’’ vs. 
‘‘devalued’’ groups. In this process, the person may come to value the social groups he or she 
belongs to that are of highest social status such that these more prestigious identities may 
predominate their sense of self, and to downplay or even deny the social identities that are associated 
with socially devalued groups (de la Sablonnière, Amiot, Cardenas, Sadykova, & Gorborukova, 
2012). It is as if the macroscopic intergroup social structure was reproduced intra-individually and 
microscopically, within the person’s own sense of self. 
While this process might not be too difficult to deal with if the person belongs to social 
groups that each have relatively equal levels of social status (e.g., belonging to a good family, 
working in a respectable organisation, being from the mainstream cultural group), we can easily see 
how these status differentials may become problematic for individuals who belong to multiple 
groups, some of which are highly socially devalued while some others are devalued. The experiences 
of many British Muslim gay men seem to exemplify this point. Although at the integration stage 
British Muslim gay men may reconcile their identities at the psychological level, it is entirely 
possible that social stigma encountered due to social status differentials between the groups could 
negatively impact identity integration and psychological coherence. More specifically, individuals’ 
engagement with stigmatising social representations (from their Muslim ingroup) regarding their gay 
identity may gradually induce the perception that their Muslim and gay ingroups are in fact 
incompatible. This can potentially disrupt the integration stage. In other words, negative social 
representations concerning an identity configuration may eventually ‘‘un-do’’ the positive steps 
taken towards identity integration during the integration stage at the psychological level. Identity 
integration is a desirable goal, but it is also a highly effortful process which involves engagement 
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with the identities at a psychological level, as well as engagement with dominant social 
representations concerning the identities at the social level. In order to facilitate the process of 
identity integration, it is necessary to create a societal context that will encourage this integration 
(e.g., Roccas & Brewer, 2002), rather than place this (sometimes very heavy) burden on individuals 
alone.  
Future Research Directions 
 The present chapter points to some directions that future research could take to investigate 
the motivational principles of identity – as described in IPT – that surface throughout the identity 
integration process. First, future research ought to explore empirically the relationships between 
different configurations of multiple identities within the self with different identity principles by 
testing the hypotheses tentatively outlined in the chapter (see also Table 1 for an overview). This 
may in turn shed light upon the likelihood of an individual reaching a particular stage of identity 
integration and of making the transition to further stages. Indeed, this hypothesis is consistent with 
research that shows that individuals more readily internalise and prioritise elements of the self which 
provide appropriate levels of the identity principles (Breakwell, 1986; Vignoles et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, given IPT’s concerns with psychological well-being, it is reasonable to examine how 
different well-being outcomes (i.e., subjective and psychological well-being; hedonic and eudemonic 
well-being) may be associated with the stages of social identity integration, as well as each identity 
principles in the context of social identity integration and each configuration of one’s multiple 
identities.  
 Ideally, these hypotheses could be tested longitudinally, among individuals who are in the 
process of joining a new social group or developing a new facet of their sense of self. Adolescents or 
young adults would represent a particularly interesting population to study as their identities and 
self-structure are in flux (Harter, 1999). Such a study could either focus on individuals’ idiosyncratic 
identities and how they combine and are coherent with one another, or target one particular identity 
(e.g., sexual orientation) that may also be socially devalued or threatened, and test the process of 
integration of these particular identities among the person’s other identities over time. Using 
statistical analyses such as hierarchical linear modeling – which allow us to test if the associations 
among particular identity principles, threat, and well-being are stronger at some time points relative 
to some other time points – will allow to test these research questions. As well, identity integration 
vs. imbalance could be assessed using newly established statistical procedures that capture the 
amount of discrepancy among one’s different identities (de la Sablonnière et al., 2012; Smith et al., 
2012).  
Solutions to a Lack of Identity Integration and Psychological Coherence 
More concretely, what is the solution to the lack of identity integration and psychological 
coherence that are often experienced as individuals’ identities are threatened? How can we ensure 
that one’s multiple social identities will be equally valued and will each contribute to defining the 
person? The solutions we put forward emphasize the agency that individuals have with respect to 
these social representations and in determining what constitutes a ‘‘valuable’’ social group or not. 
First, intra-individually, individuals who belong to groups that differ widely in their statuses could 
actively realize what are these groups’ particularities, strengths, specificities, and how these sets of 
characteristics can complement one another and bring a different facet to their sense of self. As 
another strategy, individuals may focus on the self-elements they wish to promote and present to 
others, such as some of their particular personality traits (Breakwell, 2001). For instance, individuals 
with a high degree of autonomy from their groups and whose groups encourage them to express their 
own individuality may be more able to put forward their personal strengths and idiosyncratic 
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characteristics. This could protect them from stigmatising social representations disseminated 
regarding the compatibility of identities, shielding their psychological coherence from threat (Jaspal, 
2011). Although individuals are influenced by a combination of social and psychological factors, 
they may also ultimately arrive at their own conclusion about the compatibility of interconnected 
self-elements. 
Other solutions are located at the societal level. Such solutions could aim at directly 
questioning the superiority and value of some social groups over others and questioning what 
constitutes right and wrong. For example, by socially challenging the authority of Muslim religious 
scholars, some British Muslim gay men may actively contest the social representation associated 
with their ethno-religious ingroup that homosexuality is a ‘‘sin’’ in favour of the competing 
representation associated with their gay ingroup that homosexuality constitutes a ‘‘normal’’ sexual 
orientation (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we brought together different theoretical perspectives on identity integration 
and psychological coherence and IPT. These perspectives converge by stressing how important it is 
that individuals feel a sense of intra-individual comfort with their social identities and the different 
facets of themselves, and in their need to regulate proactively these identities and facets, especially 
in times of threat. To truly bring these theories together, we proposed specific hypotheses about 
when each identity principle would become more salient throughout the identity integration process. 
We then proposed future research to test these hypotheses and suggested concrete solutions for how 
to reconcile one’s various and potentially conflicting identities. As reconciling diversity is a major 
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